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ABSTRACT
Using a modified gravity model and three measures of cultural distance, we employ the zero-
inflated negative binomial estimation technique to examine the impact of cultural distance on
international migration flows. We confirm the finding of prior studies that there exists a negative
relationship between composite measures of cultural distance and immigrant flows. Extending
the literature, we decompose our composite cultural distance measures into their component
dimensions to examine potential variability in the influences of individual dimensions on inter-
national migration. We find the cultural dimensions that reflect individualism, uncertainty avoid-
ance, and perceived gender roles are typically more influential in determining immigrant flows
than are other cultural dimensions.
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I. Introduction
Studies of the determinants of international migra-
tion have often focused on the economic character-
istics of source and destination countries (e.g. Borjas
1987; Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992; Carrington,
Detragiache, and Vishwanath 1996; and Chiswick
1999). Several recent works have also considered
the role of culture and, more specifically, the poten-
tial influence of cultural differences between
migrants’ source and destination countries on the
choice of destination (i.e. Belot and Ederveen 2012;
White 2013; Wang, De Graaff, and Nijkamp, 2014;
and White and Yamasaki 2014). Cultural differences
can be interpreted as differences in societal beliefs,
values, attitudes, and traditions and, as such, may
constitute additional indirect costs faced by potential
migrants. Falck, Lameli, and Ruhose (2015), for
example, quantify migration costs for individuals
moving to culturally-different locations within
Germany and show that migrants demand a wage
premium to overcome the additional costs associated
with migrating between culturally-different loca-
tions. This suggests that cultural distance may
reduce migration flows and lead to smaller immi-
grant stocks. In fact, the literature uniformly
identifies a negative relationship between composite
measures of cultural distance and migration.
The few studies that have considered a relation-
ship between cultural differences and international
migration have employed composite measures of
cultural differences (i.e. cultural distance) or vari-
ables which serve as proxies for cultural differences.
Our work is the first to consider the potential
impacts on migration that are attributable to differ-
ences in the underlying component dimensions of
composite source-destination cultural distance mea-
sures. Thus, the primary contributions of this article
are the provision of a more detailed understanding
of the cultural distance-migration relationship and
the identification of potential corresponding impli-
cations for immigration policy, as well as domestic
policy, which may indirectly affect migration flows.
The basis for our study is simple: while a negative
relationship between cultural differences and inter-
national migration has been documented, little else
is known of this relationship. To provide a more
complete understanding of the relationship, we first
confirm the documented negative relationship
between three different composite measures of cul-
tural distance and migration. We then decompose
each of the measures into the respective component
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dimensions and evaluate their influences on migra-
tion. The expected variability in the cultural dimen-
sion-migration relationship at this level of detail
allows for a more complete understanding of the
forces that underlie international migration.
As noted, few works have considered a relationship
between cultural distance and international migration.
Belot and Ederveen (2012) examine immigrant flows
between 22 OECD member countries during the years
1990–2013. White (2013) examines migration from 66
source countries to Denmark, Germany, and the
Netherlands during the years 1997–2002. Both studies
employ the negative binomial estimation technique.
Belot and Ederveen utilize several cultural distancemea-
sures (i.e. religious distance, linguistic distance, and
survey-basedmeasures) and report a consistent negative
relationship between cultural distance and migration
flows. Extending the literature, White confirms that
greater cultural distance between source and destination
countries hinders migration; however, a larger existing
stock of immigrants is found to correspond with larger
subsequent migration flows between their source and
destination countries, with the influences of existing
immigrant stocks on subsequent flows being greater
for more culturally distant country pairs. Thus, White
posits that existing immigrant stocks offset, at least in
part, the migration-inhibiting influences of cultural
distance.
White and Yamasaki (2014) employ the zero-
inflated negative binomial technique to examine
data for 79 immigrant source countries and six
OECD member destination countries during the
years 1975–2000. Again, it is confirmed that greater
cultural differences inhibit migration. Allowing edu-
cational attainment to proxy for skill, the authors
document variation across low-, medium-, and high-
skilled immigrant cohorts both in terms of the cul-
tural distance-migration relationship and in the
extent to which existing immigrant stocks offset the
influence of cultural distance. Wang, De Graaff, and
Nijkamp (2014) perform a regional analysis to con-
sider the attractiveness of socio-cultural composition
to potential migrants. Using a two-stage lease
squares approach, the authors find that adult first-
generation immigrants prefer to move to regions
that have cultural backgrounds similar to theirs.
Similarly, when comparing the attractiveness of 61
regions in 20 European countries to migrants, a
significant and robust negative correlation is found
between average cultural distance and attractiveness.
Extending from earlier works, we use the zero-
inflated negative binomial regression technique to
examine annual data that represent large, heteroge-
neous sets of 102 source countries and 36 destination
countries during the 1982–2013 period. We first con-
firm the documented negative relationship between
composite measures of cultural distance and migration.
We then decompose the composite measures into their
component dimensions. The corresponding coefficient
estimates reveal considerable variation in the signs,
magnitudes, and statistical significance, of the respec-
tive influences of cultural dimensions on migration.
We find the cultural dimensions most related to
gender roles and an individual’s ability to improve
one’s status within a society are the most influential
components in the link between cultural distance and
migration among country pairs. As such, domestic and/
or immigration policies that enhance gender equality or
that promote opportunities for individuals to increase
the wellbeing of themselves and their families are likely
to promote migration from countries with similar cul-
tural characteristics while simultaneously inhibiting
migration from countries where such opportunities are
less common. Accordingly, we provide a more detailed
and more complete understanding of the complex rela-
tionship between cultural differences and migration.
Our econometric specification and data are intro-
duced in Section II. Section III provides detailed
descriptions of the cultural distance measures that
we employ and discuss the respective component
dimensions. Empirical results are presented in
Section IV, while Section V concludes.
II. Empirical specification and data
We follow Lewer and Van Den Berg (2008) and
adapt the gravity model of international trade to
international migration, a strategy employed in
recent, related works on this topic.1 The frequency
of the model’s use, coupled with its flexibility in
terms of the generation of empirical specifications
that correspond with our research questions, makes
the gravity model an excellent tool for our purposes.
Equation (1) illustrates our empirical specification:
1See Belot and Ederveen (2012), White (2013), and White and Yamasaki (2014).
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FLOWijt ¼ α0 þ βCDijt þ γXijt þ δMijt
þ βφφi þ βΩΩj þ βϕϕt þ εijt (1)
The dependent variable series (FLOWijt) is the number
of persons that migrated from source country i to desti-
nation country j during year t (OECD, 2016). CDijt is a
vector that includes three composite cultural distance
measures and their corresponding component
dimensions.2 Equation (1) is estimated, in turn, employ-
ing each of the three composite cultural distance mea-
sures and then while employing the corresponding
differences in component cultural dimensions for each
source-destination country pair. Given the importance
of the cultural distance measures for our analysis, we
provide a detailed discussion of these variables in
Section 3.3 Here, we focus on the remaining variables
in our estimation equation.
The vector Xijt contains traditional gravity model
variables. Specifically, Xijt includes the ratio of destina-
tion-to-source country real GDP per capita values, the
geodesic distance between the countries, and the pro-
duct of their populations. All three variables enter
Equation (1) in natural logarithms. A higher destina-
tion-to-source real GDP per capita ratio is expected to
attract individuals who view migration as a means to
improve their economic position. Geodesic distance
serves as a measure of direct migration costs; thus,
we anticipate that greater physical distance will corre-
spond with reduced migration flows. Finally, the pro-
duct of source and destination countries’ populations is
a measure of population mass. A greater value may
indicate a higher likelihood that migration occurs
between the source and destination country pair and
that more migration occurs between the two countries.
Two dummy variables are also included – one which
identifies source and destination countries that share a
common border and another that identifies country
pairs that have (or had) a colonial relationship.4
The vector Mijt includes variables more specifi-
cally related to migration models. This includes the
existing immigrant stock from source country i that
lived in destination country j during the previous
year (International Migration Database 2016). A
larger existing immigrant stock from a potential
migrant’s source country is expected to facilitate
larger immigrant inflows if the existing stock is
able to reduce direct migration costs related to tra-
vel, finding housing, and obtaining employment.
Further, a larger existing immigrant stock can serve
to reduce indirect migration costs associated with
cultural differences (White 2013; White and
Yamasaki 2014). The vector also includes the unem-
ployment rates of the source and the destination
countries to reflect labor market conditions. We
anticipate that higher source country unemployment
rates and lower destination country unemployment
rates will correspond with greater migration flows.
We include fixed effects terms to capture time-
invariant source and destination country-specific
attributes (denoted by φ and Ω, respectively) that
may influence bilateral migration flows. Similarly, to
represent time-specific influences, we control for year
fixed effects (denoted by ϕ). Finally, ε is an assumed i.
i.d. error term. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics
for the three data samples that correspond to each
composite measure of cultural distance.
III. Composite measures of cultural distance
and their component dimensions
The inglehart measure of cultural distance
The Inglehart measure is constructed using data
from the World Value Surveys (WVS).5 The surveys
elicit views related to economics, politics, and tech-
nological advances while also covering topics such as
family values, gender roles, environmental issues,
sexual orientation, and religion (Inglehart et al.
2004). We posit that the data represent the attitudes,
values, behaviours and norms of the societies in
which the survey has been administered and that
differences across societies, as reflected by survey
responses, reflect cross-societal cultural differences.
Two component cultural dimensions are gener-
ated from the WVS data: Survival vs. Self-expression
values (SSE) and Traditional vs. Secular-rational
2All countries for which complete data are available are listed in the Appendix. For the estimations that employ the Inglehart measure of cultural distance,
complete data are available for 90 immigrant source countries and 36 destination countries. The estimations that use the Hofstede cultural distance
measures include data for 77 source countries and 35 destinations countries, while data are available for data are available for 55 source countries and 27
destinations when the GLOBE measure of cultural distance is employed.
3The data for the cultural distance measures we employ in this analysis is available upon request from the authors.
4The source for the geodesic distance variable and both dummy variables is the CEPII (2016). The source for the real GDP per capita and population series is
the World Bank (2016).
5Unless otherwise noted, descriptive information in this section is from Inglehart and Baker (2000).
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authority (TSR).6 Figure 1 provides a ‘cultural map
of the world’ that is based on data from the fourth
WVS wave.7 To illustrate the calculation of this
composite measure, distances between two country
pairs are provided in the figure.
Members of more traditional societies often exhi-
bit deference to the authority of the nation, a god, or
the family. Such deference is viewed as important or
as a general expectation. Commonly, members of
traditional societies adhere to family or communal
obligations, express a high degree of national pride
and/or to have a nationalistic outlook, and show
obedience to religious authority. In fact, the impor-
tance of religion is linked to many characteristics of
traditional societies. There is an emphasis placed on
the family, and traditional societies tend to have high
fertility rates, and divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and
suicide are viewed very negatively. Secular-rational
societies hold opposing views on these issues, often
adhering to rational-legal norms, emphasizing eco-
nomic accumulation and individual achievement.
Members of survival-oriented societies often
emphasize hard work, self-denial, and the achievement
of economic and physical security. Often, these socie-
ties see foreigners and outsiders as threats and view
ethnic diversity and cultural change negatively. This is
consistent with an intolerance towards outgroups, such
as homosexuals and minorities, and an adherence to
traditional gender roles. For example, members of
survival-oriented societies often believe that post-sec-
ondary education, jobs, and political activity are better-
suited for men than for women. Similarly, survey
respondents who are categorized as being more survi-
val-oriented often have an authoritarian political
Figure 1. Inglehart ‘Cultural Map’ of the World, WVS Wave 4 (1999–2004).
6Distilling something as unique as culture into two dimensions may appear overly simplistic; however, the two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of
the cross-cultural variance on scores for more specific values/questions.
7The Inglehart cultural distance measure is constructed, following White (2010), using country-level mean values as CDijt ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðSSEit  SSEjtÞ2 þ ðTSRit  TSR
q
jt
Þ2.
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outlook, favour increased government or state owner-
ship of businesses, and are more open to structures of
government besides democracy. Individuals in societies
that place greater emphasis on self-expression values
typically hold opposing views on these and related
issues. The rationale is that when economic security
and physical security exist cultural diversity begins to
be appreciated and sought out. This leads to greater
tolerance for deviation from traditional gender roles
and sexual norms and to greater support for equal
rights.
We posit that while cultural distance, as repre-
sented by composite measures, has been found to
hinder migration, variation likely exists among the
influences of individual cultural dimensions on migra-
tion. The example depicted in Figure 1 demonstrates.
The Inglehart cultural distance between Singapore and
the United States is 1.87. Quite similarly, the cultural
distance between Singapore and China is 1.86. Even
though the composite values are nearly identical, the
country pairs are quite different in terms of compo-
nent cultural dimension values. Singapore and the
USA differ along the TSR and SSE dimensions by
0.02 and 1.87, respectively, while Singapore and
China differ along the TSR dimension by 1.74 and
along the SSE dimension by 0.65. Considering only
composite measures of cultural distance will lead to
the erroneous conclusion that cultural differences
equally affect migration between the country pairs.
Examining differences across component cultural
dimensions, however, allows for a more accurate and
more complete depiction of the relationship.
The hofstede measure of cultural distance
The Hofstede measure is based on six cultural
dimensions.8 Four of these dimensions are from sur-
veys conducted during the late 1960s and the early
1970s. The surveys sought to collect information,
across countries, on employee values. The remaining
two dimensions were added in recent years (Hofstede,
Hofstede, and Minkov 2010). Panel A of Figure 2
presents Hofstede measures of cultural distance
between 10 countries.9 Panel B provides the dimension
scores for these countries, and the graphs depict both
composite cultural differences between select countries
and differences across the six cultural dimensions.
The Power Distance Index (PDI) reflects how
society’s members view inequalities (in wealth, power,
or social status). Societies with higher PDI scores tend
to be more willing to accept a strict hierarchical order,
while societies with lower PDI values wish to have a
more equal distribution of power among its members
and/or seek justifications for inequalities.
The Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV) dimen-
sion represents how individuals live together.
Members of societies with high IDV scores are self-
oriented, likely to formulate self-identities based on
the individual rather than their role within a group,
and often believe that each person has a right to a
private life. Such individuals, being geared towards
the care of themselves and immediate family, base
decisions largely on their needs and the needs of
those closest to them. Members of more collecti-
vist-oriented societies base self-identity on the social
system rather than the individual.
The Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS) dimension
focuses on the implications of biological differences
on the emotional and social roles of women and
men: ‘Masculinity stands for a society in which
social gender roles are clearly distinct: Men are sup-
posed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material
success; women are supposed to be more modest,
tender, and concerned with the quality of life’ while
‘[f]emininity stands for a society in which social
gender roles overlap: Both men and women are
supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with
the quality of life’ (Hofstede 2001, 297).
The Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) mea-
sures how comfortable a society is when dealing
with the uncertainty of unstructured situations.
Members of societies with high UAI values favor
structured environments and seek to reduce the
amount of uncertainty they face. These individuals
are more conservative with respect to social norms,
adhere to traditional gender roles, have limited
interest in political matters, favor more laws and
safety/security measures, and view citizen protests
unfavorably. Individuals in societies with low UAI
values minimize the number of rules or laws that
govern daily life, are more tolerant of diversity,
8Unless otherwise noted, the information provided in this section is from Hofstede (2012; 2001; and 1980).
9Following Kogut and Singh (1988), the composite Hofstede measure of cultural distance is calculated as CDij ¼
P6
k¼1
ðIikIjkÞ2
Vk
h i
=6, where I is the index value
for the kth cultural dimension, and V is the variance of the kth cultural dimension series.
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maintain a strong interest in politics, and are more
open to non-traditional gender roles.
The Pragmatic vs. Normative (PRA) dimension
represents how a culture addresses the fact that much
of what occurs in the world and what we experience
appears unexplainable. Members of societies with high
PRA scores do not believe it is possible to understand all
that happens in our lives: What is ‘true’ is very much
situation- or context-specific. These individuals have a
greater ability to accept apparent contradictions and
they quickly adapt when faced with changing circum-
stances. Individuals in more normative-oriented socie-
ties are often suspicious of societal change and exhibit a
preference for traditions and established norms. They
seek to explain most or all of what we observe in the
world and experience in our lives: Identifying a known
‘truth’ is important as it corresponds with a desire for
greater personal stability and respect for social conven-
tions and traditions.
Finally, the Indulgence vs. Restraint (IND) dimen-
sion represents the extent to which a society allows/
encourages the satisfaction of desires and impulses
that yield pleasure and happiness. Members of socie-
ties that are more indulgent in nature (i.e. that have
high IND scores) are characterized as having limited
control over their impulses or lack the desire to con-
trol impulses. Individuals in more restraint-oriented
societies have more control over their impulses or
exhibit a greater need/willingness to adopt external
controls to suppress impulses.
As with the Inglehart measure, closer examination of
Hofstede cultural differences demonstrates the need to
consider the component cultural dimensions. Consider
the composite cultural distances between various
Figure 2. Hofstede cultural distances, select country-pairs.
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countries listed in Panel A of Figure 2. The graphs in
Panel C depict differences across component dimen-
sions. The upper left graph presents three countries
(i.e. Australia, Canada, and the USA) with similar scores
for all component dimensions and, thus, which are
identified by the Hofstede measure as being culturally
similar. The upper right graph includes China, illustrat-
ing stark differences across several cultural dimensions.
The need to consider individual components
rather than composite cultural differences is further
demonstrated in the bottom two graphs in Figure 2.
The Hofstede cultural distances between Singapore
and both the United States and Argentina are quite
similar. However, looking to the lower left graph, we
see considerable differences across the component
cultural dimensions. For example, Singapore and
the USA differ in terms of the IDV dimension by
71. The corresponding difference between Singapore
and Argentina is only 26. Similarly, the US and
Singapore differ along the PRA dimension by 38,
while the difference for this dimension between
Singapore and Argentina is 78. Two other country
pairs with similar composite cultural distance values
(i.e. Argentina–Indonesia and China–Zambia) are
shown in the bottom right graph. Again, both coun-
try pairs differ to large degrees across individual
cultural dimensions despite similar composite dis-
tances. Our goal is to determine the extent to which
such differences influence migration flows.
The GLOBE cultural distance measure
The GLOBE measure is based on data collected during
1991–1994 as part of Project GLOBE (global leadership
and organizational behaviour effectiveness).10 The
GLOBE study scored 62 participant societies in 58
countries across nine cultural dimensions. Six of the
dimensions are similar to four Hofstede cultural
dimensions. Thus, in this sense, the GLOBE study
extends Hofstede’s research (Magnussen et al., 2008).
The GLOBE measure of cultural distance is con-
structed using these nine cultural dimension scores
and the methodology of Kogut and Singh (1988).
Estimated distances for 11 countries are presented in
Panel A of Figure 3. Corresponding cultural dimension
scores are provided in Panel B and, once again, we
include graphs to illustrate differences across cultural
dimensions between select societies.
The Assertiveness (ASSERT) cultural dimension
represents the level of aggressiveness and confronta-
tion that a society’s members exert in relationships
with other members. The Gender Egalitarianism
(GEND-EGL) dimension measures a society’s atti-
tudes towards gender inequality. Together, these two
dimensions are similar to Hofstede’s MAS dimen-
sion. However, the GLOBE measures distinguish
between assertiveness across all members of society
and across genders. While this distinction could be
seen as trivial, the specific inclusion of a measure of
attitudes towards gender inequality reveals unique
influences on migration flows.
The Institutional Collectivism (INST-COL) and In-
Group Collectivism (INGP-COL) dimensions are clo-
sely related to the Hofstede IDV dimension. The
INST-COL dimension measures the extent to which
society’s institutional practices are directed at collective
goals. The INGP-COL dimension involves individuals’
loyalty to their organizations, which includes families.
Similar to the Hofstede measure of individualism, these
two GLOBE dimensions embody an individual’s ability
to pursue goals related to improvement of one’s own
status, the well-being of society as a whole, or a smaller
sub-group such as their family.
Two additional GLOBE dimensions are similar in
name and description to corresponding Hofstede dim-
ensions: Power Distance (POWDIST) and Uncertainty
Avoidance (UNC-AVD). POWDIST is a measure of
the expected distribution of power within a society.
UNC-ADV reflects how societal norms and institu-
tions are relied upon to alleviate unpredictability.
Again, for comparison, the Hofstede UAI measure
reflects a society’s tolerance for uncertainty.
Three additional dimensions in the GLOBE
data, Future Orientation (FUTURE), Human
Orientation (HUMANE), and Performance
Orientation (PERFORM), are connected to how
behaviours are rewarded within a society.
FUTURE embodies a society’s attitude towards
planning for the future and delaying gratification.
The HUMANE dimension attempts to measure
how much a society encourages fairness and altru-
ism. Finally, the PERFORM dimension reflects
attitudes towards innovation and high standards.
10Unless otherwise noted, the information presented in this section is from House et al. (2004).
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Similar to Figure 2, we again illustrate the need to
analyse individual component effects on migration
rather than composite measures. A sample of com-
posite GLOBE cultural distances is presented in
Panel A of Figure 3, while component cultural
dimension scores are provided in Panel B. In Panel
C, we again show various differences using graphs.
The upper left graph depicts three countries (i.e.
Canada, England, and the USA) that have similar
scores across all component dimensions and, thus,
which are similar cultural distances from one
another. The upper right graph adds Venezuela,
which is culturally different from all three both in
terms of the component dimension scores and the
composite GLOBE cultural distance measures.
The bottom two graphs include two groups of
countries for which composite cultural distance
values are similar. In both instances, however, the
scores for the component cultural dimensions vary
considerably. Looking to the composite cultural dis-
tance value, Argentina is nearly as culturally differ-
ent from Germany as it is from Qatar. However, the
component differences between the country pairs are
quite dissimilar and such differences may influence
migration in different ways. Similarly, France and
South Korea are about as culturally distant as are
Mexico and Switzerland. Once again, however, the
component dimension scores vary considerably,
which could influence migration between the coun-
try pairs in diverse ways.
IV. Estimation results
Estimation results are presented in Table 2 through 4.
Since our dependent variable is in count form, we follow
the lead of previous studies (i.e. Belot and Ederveen
Figure 3. GLOBE dimension-based cultural distances, select country-pairs.
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(2012) and White (2013)) and employ the negative
binomial technique. Further, depending on the measure
of cultural distance employed, 10.04–10.22 percent of
our dependent variable observations have zero values.
Thus, following White and Yamasaki (2014), we con-
duct post-estimation Vuong tests and likelihood ratio
tests to determine whether the zero-inflated negative
binomial (ZINB) technique is preferable to the standard
negative binomial technique and the zero-inflated
Poisson technique. In all instances, the test statistics
(presented in Table 2 through 4) confirm the appropri-
ateness of the ZINB technique. All ZINB estimations
produce both a standard negative binomial regression
coefficient and a logit coefficient. The negative binomial
coefficient indicates the expected change in the predicted
number of migrants, while the logit coefficient is inter-
preted as the change in the log-odds of being an exces-
sive zero.
Inglehart cultural distance and international
migration
Beginning with the analysis of the Inglehart measure
of cultural distance and the corresponding compo-
nent dimensions, in column (a) of Table 2 we see a
negative and statistically significant negative bino-
mial coefficient on the Inglehart measure of cultural
distance; however, the log-odds coefficient is not
significantly different from zero. Thus, we can say
that, all else equal, a source-destination country pair
that is more culturally distant will have a lower level
of migration between them as compared to a coun-
try pair that is more culturally-similar. For a one
percent increase in the cultural distance between two
given nations, we would expect the flow of immi-
grants from country i to country j to decrease by a
factor of 0.8968 (i.e. a decrease of 10.32%).11 Even
Table 2. Inglehart cultural distance.
Neg. Bin. Logit Neg. Bin. Logit
(a) (b)
ln Inglehart Cultural Distanceijt −0.1089*** −0.0726
(0.0189) (0.0799)
ln | SSEit – SSEjt | −0.026** −0.0601
(0.0109) (0.0484)
ln | TSRit – TSRjt | −0.0297*** 0.0117
(0.0094) (0.0459)
ln Relative GDP per capitaijt −0.2176*** −0.2603*** −0.213*** −0.2555***
(0.0687) (0.0305) (0.0688) (0.0313)
ln Geodesic Distanceij −0.4275*** −0.5571*** −0.438*** −0.7029***
(0.0183) (0.0645) (0.0185) (0.0681)
ln (Populationit × Populationjt) −0.0316 0.7219*** −0.0321 0.7928***
(0.1865) (0.0364) (0.1868) (0.0386)
ln Immigrant Stockijt-1 0.6916*** −0.5887*** 0.697*** −0.6348***
(0.0074) (0.0287) (0.0074) (0.03)
Colonyij 0.2657*** 0.4859** 0.2637*** 0.5602***
(0.0363) (0.206) (0.0364) (0.2076)
Common Borderij −0.2353*** 0.5919*** −0.2405*** 0.4874***
(0.0404) (0.1892) (0.0404) (0.1896)
Unemployment Ratejt (Destination) −0.0488*** −0.1245*** −0.049*** −0.1335***
(0.0043) (0.0147) (0.0043) (0.0149)
Unemployment Rateit (Source) 0.0157*** 0.0234*** 0.0146*** 0.024***
(0.0037) (0.0087) (0.0037) (0.0089)
Constant 7.0812 −16.7815*** 7.0843 −17.6476***
(5.9471) (0.9074) (5.9544) (0.9397)
ln alpha −0.8317*** −0.8806***
(0.0167) (0.0159)
alpha 0.4353 0.4145
(0.0073) (0.0066)
Vuong test (ZINB vs. NB) 18.51*** 18.29***
LR test of alpha = 0 (ZINB vs. ZIP) 8.1E+06*** 8.1E+06***
N 8,993 8,993
Immigrant flow = 0 (% Dep. Var. obs.) 903 (10.04%) 903 (10.04%)
LR χ2 21,306*** 21,298***
Log-likelihood −60,554 −60,584
Standard errors in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ indicate significance from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All estimations include time, source country, and destination
country fixed effects terms. Coefficients not reported here due to space constraints.
11The marginal effect on the predicted count of immigrants from country i to country j during year t is calculated as expβ^  100.
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so, looking to the corresponding log-odds coeffi-
cient, it appears that greater cultural distance does
not influence whether or not any migration occurs.
When we decompose the Inglehart measure of
cultural distance into the two component dimen-
sions, SSE and TSR, we find similar results. The
negative binomial coefficients on the component
dimension variables are both negative and signifi-
cant from zero; however, the log-odds coefficients
are again not significantly different from zero. One
percent increases in the difference between the
source and destination countries’ SSE and TSR
scores decrease the flow of immigrants by factors
of 0.9743 and 0.9707, respectively (i.e. respective
decreases of 2.57% and 2.93%). These results imply
that the differences in SSE and TSR scores carry
approximately equal influences on migration.
For both estimations, the signs of the coeffi-
cients for the traditional gravity model variables
and the migration model variables are consistent
with expectations and the majority of the esti-
mates are statistically significant from zero. This
is generally the case when the Hofstede and
GLOBE cultural distance measures are examined
(see Tables 3 and 4). Focusing on the results in
Table 2, the estimated coefficients of the relative
per capita GDP, the geodesic distance, the com-
mon border variable, and the unemployment rate
of the destination country are all negative and
statistically significant. The coefficients on the
immigrant stock, the colony variable, and the
source-country unemployment rate are all posi-
tive and significant. The coefficient of the popu-
lation variable is negative in each estimation;
however, it is not statistically significant.
Hofstede cultural distance and international
migration
Results obtained while using the Hofstede measure
of cultural distance are presented in Table 3. In
column (a), we see a negative and statistically
significant negative binomial coefficient on the
Hofstede component measure of cultural distance,
and the log-odds coefficient is positive and signif-
icantly different from zero. Thus, we can again say
that, all else equal, a source-destination country
pair that is more culturally distant will have a
lower level of migration between them as
compared to a country pair that is more culturally
similar. However, as opposed to the Inglehart
measure, when the Hofstede measure is used,
greater cultural distance also implies a greater like-
lihood that no migration takes place. A 1%
increase in a country pair’s cultural distance
decreases the immigrant flow between the coun-
tries by a factor of 0.8966 (i.e. 10.34%) while also
increasing the log-odds of no migration occurring
by 0.0903.
Examining the results in column (b) of Table 3
reveals the importance of decomposing the cultural
distance measures to investigate the corresponding
influences on migration. Of the six Hofstede com-
ponents, only the coefficients of the source-destina-
tion country differences in IDV, MAS, and UAI are
statistically significant from zero and negative.
Differences in the IDV cultural dimension are the
most influential on immigrant flows. A one percent
increase in the difference in IDV, MAS, and UAI
measures decreases the immigrant flow by factors of
0.8975, 0.9067, and 0.9606, respectively (i.e. by
10.25%, 9.33%, and 3.94%, respectively). These
results demonstrate that these three components
are most influential in the previously demonstrated
cultural distance-migration link. Policies which
reduce cross-country differences in these compo-
nents are likely to promote migration from countries
with similar cultural characteristics while inhibiting
migration from countries where such opportunities
are less common.
Differences in the PDI, PRA, and IND cultural
dimensions are not found to have significant influ-
ences on immigrant flows. As for the influence of the
differences in the components on the log-odds of
migration occurring, differences in PDI appear to
significantly increase the likelihood of no migration
occurring. Curiously, while differences in MAS
reduce migration, those differences also decrease
the likelihood that no migration occurs.
International migration
Estimation of Equation (1) using the GLOBE measure
of cultural distance yields results that are similar to
those obtained when the Hofstede measure is used.
Results obtained when considering the composite
measure of cultural distance are presented in column
(a) of Table 4, while results from the estimation which
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uses the individual dimensions are presented in col-
umn (b). As expected, for the negative binomial esti-
mation, we observe a negative and statistically
significant coefficient for the composite cultural dis-
tance measure. A one percent increase in the cultural
distance measure decreases the immigrant flow by a
factor of 0.8909 (i.e. 10.91%). However, the log-odds
of no migration taking place decreases when the same
one percent increase in the composite measure of
cultural distance is considered.
As with the Hofstede measure, to accurately
examine the influences on migration, the results
presented in column (b) of Table 4 demonstrate
the need for the decomposition of the composite
measure of cultural distance. Of the nine dimen-
sions of the GLOBE cultural distance, differences
in five dimensions (i.e. ASSERT, INST-COL,
INGP-COL, HUMANE, and UNC-AVD) corre-
spond to negative and statistically significant
impacts on migration. One of the nine dimensions
(GEND-EGL) demonstrates a positive and signifi-
cant impact on international migration, while the
coefficient estimates of the remaining three dimen-
sions are not significantly different from zero.
Differences in the INGP-COL dimension are
most influential on migration flows, and one per-
cent increases in the differences between values of
INGP-COL, UNC-AVD, and HUMANE corre-
spond with decreases in the immigrant flow by
factors of 0.947, 0.9657, and 0.973 (i.e. 5.53%,
3.43%, and 2.7%), respectively. A one percent
increase in the difference in GEND-EGL values
Table 3. Hofstede cultural distance.
Neg. Bin. Logit Neg. Bin. Logit
(a) (b)
ln Hofstede Cultural Distanceij −0.1092*** 0.0903**
(0.011) (0.0445)
ln | PDIit – PDIjt | 0.0027 0.1571***
(0.0096) (0.0378)
ln | IDVit – IDVjt | −0.1081*** 0.0217
(0.0095) (0.0365)
ln | MASit – MASjt | −0.0979*** −0.1061***
(0.0071) (0.0316)
ln | UAIit – UAIjt | −0.0402*** 0.0282
(0.0066) (0.0305)
ln | PRAit – PRAjt | −0.0035 −0.0173
(0.0066) (0.0304)
ln | INDt – INDjt | 0.0044 0.0488
(0.0074) (0.0319)
ln Relative GDP per capitaijt −0.294*** −0.2531*** −0.2786*** −0.2785***
(0.0523) (0.0216) (0.0524) (0.0228)
ln Geodesic Distanceij −0.4641*** −0.1169*** −0.417*** −0.1077***
(0.0129) (0.0384) (0.0131) (0.0399)
ln (Populationit × Populationjt) −0.0349 0.3475*** −0.0277 0.3063***
(0.1016) (0.021) (0.1015) (0.0208)
ln Immigrant Stockijt-1 0.7207*** −0.3311*** 0.6825*** −0.3218***
(0.0056) (0.0179) (0.0056) (0.0181)
Colonyij 0.3099*** 0.1517 0.2944*** 0.1519
(0.03) (0.1497) (0.0304) (0.1503)
Common Borderij −0.3181*** 0.6256*** −0.2128*** 0.5479***
(0.0312) (0.1377) (0.031) (0.1388)
Unemployment Ratejt (Destination) −0.049*** 0.0431*** −0.053*** 0.0424***
(0.0032) (0.0074) (0.0032) (0.0073)
Unemployment Rateit (Source) 0.0282*** 0.0229*** 0.0231*** 0.0191***
(0.0027) (0.0062) (0.0027) (0.0063)
Constant 6.7641** −10.6759*** 6.9989** −9.6892***
(3.384) (0.5723) (3.3764) (0.6052)
ln alpha −0.8328*** −0.8316***
(0.0118) (0.0119)
Alpha 0.4349 0.4354
(0.0051) (0.0052)
Vuong test (ZINB vs. NB) 22.50*** 22.17***
LR test of alpha = 0 (ZINB vs. ZIP) 1.3E+07*** 1.2E+07***
N 16,513 16,513
Immigrant flow = 0 (% Dep. Var. obs.) 1681 (10.18%) 1681 (10.18%)
LR χ2 37,752*** 37,770***
Log-likelihood −106,144 106,123
See Table 2 notes.
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increases the immigrant flow by a factor of 1.0503
(i.e. an increase of 5.03%).
As with the results using the Hofstede compo-
nents, these results allow for a more detailed under-
standing of the characteristics driving the
previously-identified link between cultural differ-
ences and migration. Components of cultural dis-
tance that include the individual’s opportunity for
success, gender roles, and uncertainty avoidance are
the most influential underlying components within
the relationship between cultural distance and
migration. Given these results, any policies which
change a country’s scores among these components
will have the greatest effects on where its citizens are
most likely to migrate to or from.
While the positive relationship between immi-
grant flows and differences along the Gender
Egalitarianism dimension, which is also closely
related to the Masculinity dimension, may appear
odd, a reasonable explanation can be made. The
Masculinity dimension, as well as the Assertiveness
dimension, relates gender and attitudes towards
roles in society and quality of life. Gender
Egalitarianism can be seen as tolerance of gender
Table 4. GLOBE cultural distance.
Neg. Bin. Logit Neg. Bin. Logit
(a) (b)
ln GLOBE Cultural Distanceij −0.118*** −0.4898**
(0.0284) (0.2307)
ln | ASSERTi – ASSERTj | −0.0189** −0.1123***
(0.0086) (0.0354)
ln | INST-COLi – INST-COLj | −0.019** −0.1211***
(0.0095) (0.0393)
ln | INGP-COLi – INGP-COLj | −0.0545*** 0.0456
(0.0097) (0.0397)
ln | FUTUREi – FUTUREj | 0.0117 −0.148***
(0.0099) (0.0387)
ln | GEND-EGLi – GEND-EGLj | 0.0491*** −0.0738**
(0.0086) (0.0362)
ln | HUMANEi – HUMANEj | −0.0274*** 0.0256
(0.0094) (0.0399)
ln | PERFORMi – PERFORMj | 0.0051 0.1697***
(0.0079) (0.0398)
ln | POWDISTi – POWDISTj | 0.0078 −0.1135***
(0.0093) (0.0364)
ln | UNC-AVDi – UNC-AVDj | −0.0349*** 0.0595
(0.0093) (0.0418)
ln Relative GDP per capitaijt −0.3529*** 1.4253** 0.1432** −0.1805***
(0.0658) (0.5819) (0.0641) (0.0292)
ln Geodesic Distanceij −0.4753*** 0.0188 −0.4053*** −0.1464***
(0.0157) (0.1461) (0.0159) (0.0456)
ln (Populationit × Populationjt) −0.0341 −4.0812*** −0.3657*** 0.1052***
(0.1184) (0.897) (0.1192) (0.0277)
ln Immigrant Stockijt-1 0.6985*** −0.4885*** 0.7328*** −0.2619***
(0.0074) (0.0614) (0.0073) (0.0232)
Colonyij 0.5326*** −0.8146*** 0.4013*** −0.1202
(0.0365) (0.3156) (0.0374) (0.1885)
Common Borderij −0.3705*** 1.3126*** −0.3422*** 0.4041**
(0.0397) (0.3151) (0.0405) (0.1761)
Unemployment Ratejt (Destination) −0.035*** 0.1558*** −0.0301*** 0.0245**
(0.004) (0.057) (0.004) (0.0097)
Unemployment Rateit (Source) 0.0206*** −0.0768*** 0.0184*** −0.0139
(0.0034) (0.0284) (0.0034) (0.009)
Constant 7.0287* 117.31*** 13.8154*** −2.6881***
(3.7289) (28.4994) (3.7355) (0.7938)
ln alpha −0.8829*** −0.9081***
(0.0151) (0.015)
Alpha 0.4136 0.4033
(0.0063) (0.006)
Vuong test (ZINB vs. NB) 27.59*** 19.64***
LR test of alpha = 0 (ZINB vs. ZIP) 1.0E+07*** 9.3E+06***
N 9,489 9,489
Immigrant flow = 0 (% Dep. Var. obs.) 970 (10.22%) 970 (10.22%)
LR χ2 22,165*** 21,818***
Log-likelihood −63,263 −64,837
See Table 2 notes.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 3587
inequality, particularly with regard to opportunities
for women. In that case, one can see that greater
differences in a country’s tolerance of gender equal-
ity might actually spur more migration, and this
result provides a strong illustration of the need for
this type of analysis at the component-level of cul-
tural differences.
The effects of increases in differences in INST-
COL and ASSERT are nearly equal, with one percent
increases decreasing immigrant flows by factors of
0.9812 (1.88%) and 0.9813 (1.87%), respectively. The
results of the logit estimation indicate that only an
increase in the difference of the PERFORM cultural
dimension results in a significant increase in the
likelihood that no migration occurs. Increased dif-
ferences in FUTURE, INST-COL, POWDIST,
ASSERT, and GEND-EGL all result in a decreased
likelihood of no migration occurring.
V. Conclusions and implications
We use the zero-inflated negative binomial regres-
sion technique and a modified gravity model to
examine the influences of traditional migration vari-
ables and three separate composite measures of cul-
tural distance on international migration flows.
Employing annual data for large, heterogeneous
sets of 102 immigrant source countries and 36 desti-
nation countries during the 1982-2GL013 period, we
have confirmed the negative relationship between
cultural differences and international migration
that has been documented by prior studies. More
specifically, in response to one percent increases in
the Inglehart, Hofstede, and GLOBE composite mea-
sures of cultural distance, international migration
flows are estimated to decrease by factors of 0.8968,
0.8966, and 0.8909, respectively (i.e. 10.32%, 10.34%,
and 10.91%, respectively).
Extending the literature, we have decomposed
each of the composite measures of cultural distance
into their component dimensions to examine the
cultural distance–migration relationship in greater
detail. Results obtained from the estimation of a
series of regression models in which the 2-dimen-
sion Inglehart, 6-dimension Hofstede, and 9-dimen-
sion GLOBE composite measures of cultural
distance have been replaced by their respective com-
ponent cultural dimensions indicate variability
across the dimensions of cultural differences in
terms of the relationship between these dimensions
of cultural distance and migration flows. The
observed variability highlights that country pairs
with similar composite cultural distance values may
not show the same expected migration, all else equal.
Looking to the component dimensions of the
Inglehart measure, we see that greater differences
along the TSR dimension are slightly more influen-
tial than differences along the SSE dimension,
though both are negative and statistically significant
from zero. When considering the component
dimensions of the Hofstede measure, we see signifi-
cant migration-inhibiting influences of differences
along the individualism (IDV), masculinity (MAS)
and uncertainty avoidance (UAI) dimensions.
Similarly, when considering the dimensions of the
GLOBE measure, listed in order of magnitude, we
find difference in the In-group Collectivism
(INGP-COL), Uncertainty Avoidance (UNC-AVD),
Humane Orientation (HUMANE), Institutional
Collectivism (INST-COL), and Assertiveness
(ASSERT) dimensions are all negatively related
with international migration and statistically signifi-
cant from zero. Greater differences along the gender
egalitarianism (GEND-EGL) dimension are found to
be positively related to international migration.
Our findings have important implications when one
considers how both immigration policies and domestic
policies may shapemigration. The IDV and INGP-COL
dimensions in the Hofstede and GLOBE measures,
respectively, are the most influential with respect to
migration flows. Within the broader composite mea-
sures, these components embody an individual’s ability
to pursue goals related to improvement of one’s status
and the well-being of the immediate family. Any policy
that directly or indirectly changes the IDV or INGP-
COL score will have the most influential effect on
migration between country pairs. As the component
dimension values increase (decrease), we expect corre-
sponding increases in migration to/from countries with
higher (lower) IDV or INGP-COL values while simul-
taneously seeing decreases in migration to/from coun-
tries with lower (higher) IDV or INGP-COL values.
Extending this idea towards immigration policy,
assimilation policies which enhance opportunities
for employment, advancement, and entrepreneurial
activity would appear to have the greatest impact on
migration flows. An additional finding is that differ-
ences in gender roles within a society strongly
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influence international migration flows. While our
data do not allow for separate examination of men
and women, we can infer that the role of women in a
society is a major factor in this result. Finally, greater
differences in uncertainty avoidance inhibit migration
between the countries. Policies that affect this com-
ponent will likely shift the countries from/to where
migration occurs as more migration occurs from/to
countries with similar levels of conservatism.
While our results confirm the findings or prior
research on the relationship between cross-societal cul-
tural differences and international migration, we extend
the related literature by affording a more detailed and,
thus, more complete understanding of the influences of
cultural differences on international migration. The
implications of a negative influence of cultural distance
on migration are likely far-reaching, and the resulting
more detailed understanding of the relationship may
benefit the formulation of immigration policy.
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Appendix. Country listing (with ISO3 codes in
parentheses)12
Source countries
Albania (ALB), Algeriaa (DZA), Angolab (AGO), Argentina
(ARG), Armeniaa (ARM), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT),
Azerbaijana (AZE), Bangladesha,b (BGD), Belarusa (BLR),
Belgiuma,b (BEL), Boliviac (BOL), Bosnia and Herzegovinaa
(BIH), Brazil (BRA), Bulgariaa,b (BGR), Burkina Fasoa,b
(BFA), Canada (CAN), Cape Verdeb (CPV), Chilea,b (CHL),
China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Costa Ricac (CRI), Croatiaa,
b (HRV), Cyprusa (CYP), Czech Republica,b (CZE), Denmark
(DNK), Dominican Republica,b (DOM), Ecuadorc (ECU),
Egypt (EGY), El Salvador (SLV), Estoniaa,b (EST), Ethiopiaa
(ETH), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Georgiaa,c (GEO),
Germany (DEU), Ghanaa,b (GHA), Greece (GRC),
Guatemalaa,c (GTM), Hong Kong (HKG), Hungary (HUN),
Icelanda,b (ISL), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Irana,b (IRN),
Iraqa,b (IRQ), Ireland (IRL), Israela,c (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan
(JPN), Jordana,b (JOR), Kazakhstanc (KAZ), Korea, Rep. of
(KOR), Kuwaitc (KWT), Kyrgyz Republica (KGZ), Latviaa,b
(LVA), Lebanonb (LBN), Libyab (LBY), Lithuaniaa,b (LTU),
Luxembourga,b (LUX), Macedonia, FYRa (MKD), Malaysia
(MYS), Malia (MLI), Maltaa,b (MLT), Mexico (MEX),
Moldovaa (MDA), Morocco (MAR), Mozambiqueb (MOZ),
Namibiac (NAM) Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL),
Nigeria (NGA), Norwaya,b (NOR), Pakistana,b (PAK), Perua,b
(PER), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT),
Puerto Ricoa (PRI), Qatarc (QAT), Russian Federation
(RUS), Rwandaa (RWA), Saudi Arabiaa,b (SAU), Singapore
(SGP), Slovak Republic (SVK), Sloveniaa,b (SVN), South
Africaa,b (ZAF), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland
(CHE), Tanzaniaa,b (TZA), Thailand (THA), Trinidad and
Tobagoa,b (TTO), Turkey (TUR), Ukrainea (UKR), United
Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA), Uruguaya,b (URY),
Venezuela (VEN), Vietnama,b (VNM), Zambia (ZMB),
Zimbabwea,c (ZWE).
Destination countries
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgiuma,b (BEL),
Canada (CAN), Chilea,b (CHL), Czech Republica,b
(CZE), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France
(FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary
(HUN), Icelanda,b (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Israela,c (ISR),
Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea, Rep. of (KOR), Latviaa,
b (LVA), Lithuaniaa,b (LTU), Luxembourga,b (LUX),
Mexico (MEX), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand
(NZL), Norwaya,b (NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal
(PRT), Russian Federation (RUS), Slovak Republic
(SVK), Sloveniaa,b (SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden
(SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR), United
Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA).
12The absence of superscripts on the name of a country indicates that data are available for all estimations regardless of the measure of cultural distance
employed. The superscripts a, b, and c indicates that, for the corresponding country, data available for the estimations that employ the Inglehart, Hofstede,
and GLOBE measures of cultural distance measure, respectively.
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Appendix A3. GLOBE cultural dimensions.
Country
Assertiveness
(ASSERT)
Institutional
collectivism
(INST-COL)
In-Group
collectivism
(INGP-COL)
Future
orientation
(FUTURE)
Gender
egalitarianism
(GEND-EGL)
Humane
orientation
(HUMANE)
Performance
orientation
(PERFORM)
Power
distance
(POWDIST)
Uncertainty
avoidance
(UNC-AVD)
Albania 4.57 4.28 5.51 3.69 3.48 4.40 4.57 4.44 4.45
Argentina 4.18 3.66 5.51 3.10 3.44 3.94 3.63 5.56 3.63
Australia 4.29 4.31 4.14 4.09 3.41 4.32 4.37 4.81 4.40
Austria 4.59 4.34 4.89 4.47 3.18 3.77 4.47 5.00 5.10
Bolivia 3.78 3.96 5.44 3.55 3.45 3.99 3.57 4.46 3.32
Brazil 4.25 3.94 5.16 3.90 3.44 3.76 4.11 5.24 3.74
Canada 4.09 4.36 4.22 4.40 3.66 4.51 4.46 4.85 4.54
China 3.77 4.67 5.86 3.68 3.03 4.29 4.37 5.02 4.81
Colombia 4.16 3.84 5.59 3.35 3.64 3.72 3.93 5.37 3.62
Costa Rica 3.83 3.95 5.26 3.64 3.56 4.38 4.10 4.70 3.84
Denmark 4.04 4.93 3.63 4.59 4.02 4.67 4.40 4.14 5.32
Ecuador 3.98 3.82 5.55 3.66 3.09 4.45 4.06 5.29 3.63
Egypt 3.91 4.36 5.49 3.80 2.90 4.60 4.15 4.76 3.97
El Salvador 4.49 3.74 5.22 3.73 3.23 3.69 3.72 5.56 3.69
England 4.23 4.31 4.08 4.31 3.67 3.74 4.16 5.26 4.70
Finland 4.05 4.77 4.23 4.39 3.55 4.19 4.02 5.08 5.11
France 4.44 4.20 4.66 3.74 3.81 3.60 4.43 5.68 4.66
Georgia 4.15 4.03 6.18 3.45 3.52 4.17 3.85 5.15 3.54
Germany 4.77 3.67 4.59 4.04 3.17 3.45 4.16 5.70 5.19
Greece 4.55 3.41 5.28 3.53 3.53 3.44 3.34 5.35 3.52
Guatemala 3.96 3.78 5.54 3.35 3.14 3.91 3.85 5.47 3.44
Hong Kong 4.53 4.03 5.33 3.88 3.26 3.72 4.69 4.94 4.17
Hungary 4.71 3.63 5.31 3.31 4.02 3.39 3.50 5.57 3.26
India 3.70 4.25 5.81 4.04 2.89 4.45 4.11 5.29 4.02
Indonesia 3.70 4.27 5.50 3.61 3.04 4.47 4.14 4.93 3.92
Ireland 3.93 4.57 5.12 3.93 3.19 4.96 4.30 5.13 4.25
Israel 4.19 4.40 4.63 3.82 3.21 4.07 4.03 4.71 3.97
Italy 4.12 3.75 4.99 3.34 3.30 3.66 3.66 5.45 3.85
Japan 3.69 5.23 4.72 4.29 3.17 4.34 4.22 5.23 4.07
Kazakhstan 4.51 4.38 5.50 3.72 3.87 4.44 3.72 5.40 3.76
Korea (South) 4.36 5.20 5.71 3.90 2.45 3.73 4.53 5.69 3.52
Kuwait 3.56 4.32 5.70 3.18 2.59 4.44 3.79 4.97 4.02
Malaysia 3.77 4.45 5.47 4.39 3.31 4.76 4.16 5.09 4.59
Mexico 4.31 3.95 5.62 3.75 3.50 3.84 3.97 5.07 4.06
Morocco 4.72 4.18 6.37 3.50 3.08 4.52 4.31 6.14 3.95
Namibia 3.81 4.02 4.39 3.32 3.69 3.83 3.52 5.29 4.09
Netherlands 4.46 4.62 3.79 4.72 3.62 4.02 4.46 4.32 4.81
New Zealand 3.47 4.96 3.58 3.46 3.18 4.43 4.86 5.12 4.86
ASSERT INST-COL INGP-COL FUTURE GEND-EGL HUMANE PERFORM POWDIST UNC-AVD
Nigeria 4.53 4.00 5.34 3.95 3.04 3.96 3.79 5.32 4.14
Philippines 3.85 4.37 6.14 3.92 3.42 4.88 4.21 5.15 3.69
Poland 4.11 4.51 5.55 3.23 3.94 3.67 3.96 5.09 3.71
Portugal 3.75 4.02 5.64 3.77 3.69 3.96 3.65 5.50 3.96
Qatar 4.39 4.78 5.07 4.08 3.86 4.79 3.76 5.05 4.26
Russia 3.86 4.57 5.83 3.06 4.07 4.04 3.53 5.61 3.09
Singapore 4.06 4.77 5.66 4.88 3.52 3.29 4.81 4.92 5.16
Slovenia 4.01 4.09 5.49 3.56 3.84 3.75 3.62 5.32 3.76
Spain 4.39 3.87 5.53 3.52 3.06 3.29 4.00 5.53 3.95
Sweden 3.41 5.26 3.46 4.37 3.72 4.09 3.67 4.94 5.36
Switzerland 4.58 4.20 4.04 4.80 3.12 3.73 5.04 5.05 5.42
Taiwan 3.70 4.30 5.45 3.65 2.92 3.82 4.27 5.00 4.04
Thailand 3.58 3.88 5.72 3.27 3.26 4.87 3.84 5.62 3.79
Turkey 4.42 4.02 5.79 3.74 3.02 3.92 3.82 5.43 3.67
United States 4.50 4.21 4.22 4.13 3.36 4.18 4.45 4.92 4.15
Venezuela 4.25 3.96 5.41 3.43 3.60 4.19 3.41 5.22 3.55
Zambia 4.00 4.41 5.72 3.55 2.88 5.12 4.01 5.23 3.92
Zimbabwe 4.04 4.08 5.53 3.76 3.09 4.38 4.20 5.54 4.12
Group average 4.13 4.25 5.16 3.81 3.37 4.11 4.07 5.17 4.13
Variance 0.120 0.171 0.484 0.191 0.127 0.197 0.146 0.138 0.332
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